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Abstract
To enable economically efficient future adaptation to water scarcity some countries are
revising water management institutions such as water rights or licensing systems to
more effectively protect ecosystems and their services. Allocating more flow to the en-
vironment though can mean less abstraction for economic production, or the inability5
to accommodate new entrants (diverters). Modern licensing arrangements should si-
multaneously enhance environmental flows and protect water abstractors who depend
on water. Making new licensing regimes compatible with tradable water rights is an im-
portant component of water allocation reform. Regulated water markets can help de-
crease the societal cost of water scarcity whilst enforcing environmental and/or social10
protections. In this article we simulate water markets under a regime of fixed volumetric
water abstraction licenses with fixed minimum flows or under a scalable water license
regime (using water “shares”) with dynamic environmental minimum flows. Shares al-
low adapting allocations to available water and dynamic environmental minimum flows
can vary as a function of ecological requirements. We investigate how a short-term15
spot market manifests within each licensing regime. We use a river-basin-scale hydro-
economic agent model that represents individual abstractors and can simulate a spot
market under both licensing regimes. We apply this model to the Great Ouse river
basin in Eastern England with public water supply, agricultural, energy and industrial
water using agents. Results show the proposed shares with dynamic environmental20
flow licensing system protects river flows more effectively than the current static mini-
mum flow requirements during a dry historical year, but that the total opportunity cost to
water abstractors of the environmental gains is a 10 to 15% loss in economic benefits.
1 Introduction
Recent projections show that the amount of available water runoff currently appropri-25
ated for human needs globally are around 50%, likely to rise to 70% by 2025 (Postel
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et al., 1996; Postel, 1998). Current water diversion practices lead to degradation of
river environments in some areas, resulting in regional water scarcity and conflicts
(Smakhtin et al., 2004).
Water trading developed in some countries as a response to water scarcity with the
aim of allocating water efficiently (Bjornlund, 2003; Howe et al., 1986; Thobanl, 1997).5
In the US, Chile, South Africa and Australia trading is permitted or encouraged in some
regions. In US and Australia, government-allocated funds are used to buy back water
allocations to leave water in the environment (Brewer et al., 2008; Wheeler et al., 2013;
Wilkinson, 2008). These methods are short-term solutions to immediate water scarcity
problems and such uses of public funds can be a contentious issue. Reforms of water10
allocation systems are under way in countries such as the US, South Africa, Australia,
Russia and England and Wales to ensure environmental protection in the longer term
(Gleick, 2011; Stern, 2013; Young, 2012). In England there are significant institutional
barriers to water trading (EA and Ofwat, 2008; Hodgson, 2006).
The ability of water markets to help users adapt to water scarcity challenges is heav-15
ily dependent on the water resource management institutions (Grafton et al., 2011).
The issues of fairness in water allocation between environmental and human uses,
and between varying human uses have become controversial as economic consider-
ations and market re-allocation may not result in a socially just outcome (Syme et al.,
1999). Without appropriate regulatory ability to preserve shared ecosystem services20
there is a risk that over-abstraction will continue or worsen under market systems.
The objectives of water resource allocation systems is to regulate access to wa-
ter resources, ensuring flexibility, security of access, predictability, and fairness, and
to reflect public values and opportunity costs (Howe et al., 1986). More recently en-
vironmental protection has been added to those goals. One of the methods used to25
preserve adequate river flows is to set a minimum flow below which water abstrac-
tion must reduce or cease (Acreman, 2005). These static threshold or minimum flow
methods of maintaining river flows often do not achieve ecologically or economically
efficient results (Arthington et al., 2006; Katz, 2011). The aquatic environment relies
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on a natural hydrological cycle, but human water abstractions alter the natural flow
variability which is important to sustaining riverine species, and minimum flow regimes
do not support natural flow regimes (Poff et al., 1997). Hence, fixed volumetric al-
lowances have evolved into allowances with reference to river flow conditions such as
“per cent of flow” regime, with abstractions limited to a sustainable share of the natural5
river flows (Richter et al., 2012). Environmental flow methods are used to determine
the sustainable levels of abstractions. Over 200 environmental flow approaches have
been developed to provide the policy-makers with tools to re-design water allocation
systems ensuring that river ecology is protected, whilst taking into account human wa-
ter needs (Acreman and Dunbar, 2004). Environmental flow methodologies have been10
developed and applied in 44 countries, spanning 6 world regions with the US the most
active proponent of the approach (Tharme, 2003).
Allocation of water across individual water abstractors, similarly, should be linked to
water availability. Examples of these new systems can be found in Australia (Libecap
et al., 2010; Young, 2012), Chile and Mexico (Hodgson, 2006). Water allocations in15
this system are according to available water and river flow conditions. The shares are
translated into volumetric licenses for each abstractor.
In re-designing a water allocation system policy makers need to assess how well
the new system meets the objectives outlined above, and whether it promotes eco-
nomically efficient allocation whilst preventing negative externalities of water diversions20
on the environment or other users. River basin modelling and integrated assessment
(Loucks et al., 1981; Letcher and Jakeman, 2003) can provide insights into potential en-
vironmental and water allocation outcomes of the proposed changes. Hydro-economic
models that incorporate hydrology, institutions and economics are particularly rele-
vant (Harou et al., 2009). Traditional hydro-economic models can simulate aggregate25
regional results of water trading (Draper et al., 2003; Ward et al., 2006). To determine
market outcomes at the scale of individual water diverters, however, it is important
to simulate the transactions between individual water users. Cheng et al. (2009) de-
veloped a flow-path model formulation allowing to track transactions between users.
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Erfani et al. (2013) presented an efficient variant used by Erfani et al. (2014) to model
a surface water spot market.
This paper applies and extends the Erfani et al. (2014) model to a case-study basin
in Eastern England to assess possible outcomes of water trading under two licens-
ing systems: (1) static minimum environmental flows with volumetric licenses; and5
(2) a share-based licensing system where water allocation is updated according to cur-
rent flow conditions and dynamically updated environmental flows (EA, 2013; Young
and McColl, 2005). While in the first system there is no license scaling, under the sec-
ond system, the license volumes are scaled proportionally to abstractors’ share. The
next section describes the generalised river basin model formulation used to model10
both licensing regimes. Section 3 outlines the case study and additional constraints to
represent the Ouse basin and its regulatory environment. Section 4 presents results
followed by a discussion in Sect. 5 and conclusions in Sect. 6.
2 Methods
The model presented in this paper is an extension of the hydro-economic model of15
Erfani et al. (2013) which uses economic optimisation to simulate and track pair-wise
water market transactions between individual water users. This paper introduces dy-
namic environmental flows and scalable “share” licenses into the pair-wise transaction
tracking hydro-economic water market simulator to evaluate how they perform in a wa-
ter trading context. The short-term spot water market considered here is a system20
where each user can observe the bid and ask prices of others, as could exist with an
online transaction system. Model constraints are used to represent the physical, reg-
ulatory and water user-specific realities. The model formulation described in Sect. 2.1
and Appendix A summarise previous work (Erfani et al., 2014). In this paper, the model
is further extended in Sects. 2.2 and 2.3 to model the dynamic environmental flows and25
scalable water licenses.
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2.1 Pair-wise trading model
The Erfani et al. (2013) model (see Appendix A for equations) uses economic optimi-
sation subject to constraints to simulate a short-term (spot) market for water. The river
network is modelled as a network of nodes (e.g. demands, junctions, reservoirs) and
conveyance links (e.g. river reaches) and water balance is ensured at each junction or5
storage node. Economic benefit functions that quantify the economics gains from water
diverted must be provided for each demand node at each time step. The maximized
objective function is the sum of economic benefits from water use across all users in
each individual time step, net of transaction costs. This objective functions identifies
trades that make economic sense whist meeting constraints that ensure regulations10
and agent behaviours are considered. For example it includes a penalty function for
deviating from the target level of reservoir storage. Water user nodes consume some
water using their own license or by buying from other license holders, and can sell the
rest to others. Since most abstractors’ water use is not fully consumptive, some water
is returned to the river as return flow. The sum of volumes of water abstracted and sold15
by the users cannot exceed both their annual and weekly licensed allocation.
2.2 Dynamic environmental flows
The total amount of water across all users allowed for abstraction is the difference
between the natural flow (excluding human water diversions and additions) and the
minimum flow (MinFlow) at the downstream gauges. MinFlow is used in the following20
equation:∑
i
COi l=1
xkil + inFll ≥MinFlowj ∀l ∈ Junction, j ∈Gauge, k ∈ river (1)
for both the fixed and dynamic environmental flow water management systems. inFll is
the external inflow at junction node l . The junction node l is connected to the gauge j to25
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record how much water passes by the gauge j . With fixed volumetric water abstraction
licenses, water available for abstraction is set using a fixed value of minimum flows
(MinFlowj ) regardless of the available flow recorded at the gauges. In the case of
dynamic environmental flows, MinFlowj is a function of naturalised river flows (flow
without human water abstractions). Naturalised river flows are estimated from the river5
flow through the gauging stations, and the MinFlowj is the sustainable minimum level
of river flows.
2.3 License scaling
Under license scaling, the river basin is divided into sub-catchments separated by river
flow gauging stations. The water available for abstraction at each gauge j is divided10
between the upstream license holders in that sub-catchment proportionally to their
shares.
WaterAbstractedki ≤

θj ×WkLii , nFlGAj −MinFlowj ≤
∑
l∈User
WlGAl j=1
WkLil
WkLii , otherwise
(2)
∀i ∈ User,k ∈ river15
where
θj =
nFlGAj −MinFlowj∑
l∈User
WlGAl j=1
WkLil
.
In the above equation, nFlGAj −MinFlowj is the water available for abstraction for li-
cense holders upstream of gauge j .20
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3 Case study
3.1 Water management in England and Wales
In England water diversions (“abstractions”) are regulated by the Environment Agency
(EA). The abstraction licenses incur yearly charges based on the volumetric size of the
license, and not on the actual abstraction volumes. The licenses state maximum daily5
and yearly abstraction volumes. Environmental protection is enforced through license-
specific Hands-off Flow (HoF) restrictions which refer to minimum flow required through
the relevant gauging station, below which the license is temporarily suspended. There
are emergency provisions set out in Sect. 57 of the Water Resources Act 1991 which
reduce spray irrigation in times of drought. Water trading is allowed, but rarely carried10
out. There is no water license spot-market; each transaction has to be assessed and
approved by the EA over several months.
The current system was set up in 1960s and is not designed to manage competing
water uses effectively. HoFs were introduced in an attempt to protect the environment
from over-abstractions and were applied to newly issued licenses, with no change in15
allocations for legacy licenses. There is a lack of appropriate incentives or price signals
for efficient water use and there are institutional barriers to water trading (Defra, 2011).
The current licensing system in many areas results in over-abstraction and environ-
mental damage: 18% of river catchments are classed as over-licensed, and a further
15% – over-abstracted (EA, December 2008). In around a quarter of water bodies in20
England and 7% of water bodies in Wales new consumptive abstractions cannot be
provided with reliable water supply (EA, 2011). Nationally, over a third of licenses are
not utilized and kept as a reserve in case of a drought, making 20% of the licensed
volume unused, but which could have otherwise been licensed to new uses requiring
water (EA and Ofwat, 2012). Water trading could provide flexibility in regional water re-25
source management and is being considered in individual water resource management
zones (Acreman and Ferguson, 2010).
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In response to the shortcomings of the current English abstraction licensing system
it is currently being reformed. The aim is to allow water abstractors to more easily
manage changes in water availability and regulators to better guarantee environmental
flows (EA and Ofwat, 2012). The new regime is due to be implemented by the mid- to
late-2020s. In the meantime, the EA has been assessing sensitivity of rivers to abstrac-5
tions through the Restoring Sustainable Abstraction program, and making changes to
licenses on a case-by-case basis to help prevent further damage.
Water licensing changes in England and Wales are designed to comply with the Eu-
ropean Water Framework Directive (WFD). The aim of the WFD is to bring the quality of
rivers to “good ecological status”. Methods to define environmental flow requirements10
have been developed to enable policy makers to move away from the “minimum flow”
approach to a river management approach that takes into consideration human water
needs (Acreman and Dunbar, 2004). These informed the Environmental Flow Indicator
(EFI) approach to dynamic environmental flows developed by the Environment Agency.
The EFI approach uses flow duration curves to fix the percentage of flow that can be15
abstracted at different flow levels. Each river in England and Wales has been assigned
with an “abstraction sensitivity band” according to its sensitivity to changes in flow. With
reference to the abstraction sensitivity, the percentage of flow allowed for abstraction is
assigned to each river (EA, 2013).
3.2 Modelling the Great Ouse river basin20
To investigate the outcomes of potential license reform options, we apply the proposed
model to the 3000 km2 Great Ouse river basin in Eastern England (Fig. 1). The largest
towns are Milton Keynes and Bedford. The basin is characterized by gently rolling land
in the upper part and flood plains and meadows in the lower part. Average annual
rainfall varies from 540mm in the east to 670mm in the west (EA, March 2005).25
There are 94 active surface water licenses belonging to users from four sectors:
energy, agriculture, public and private water supply and industry. Approximate loca-
tions of users are shown in Fig. 1. Around 95% of yearly surface water abstractions
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are appropriated by the Public Water Supply (PWS) company and either stored in the
reservoir (marked PWS Reservoir in Fig. 1) or input into treatment and distribution
network (abstraction point labelled PWS Intake in Fig. 1). The second-largest water
abstractor is the power station, which uses 4% of the total volume abstracted for cool-
ing.5
3.3 Case study-specific constraints
In addition to the mass balance constraints described in Sect. 2, the constraints sum-
marized below are used to represent regulatory rules and water use behaviours in the
basin. Incorporating rules is possible since the optimisation model is solved separately
for each weekly time-step; abstractors have limited hydrological foresight.10
3.3.1 Current license restrictions
Water abstraction restrictions under the current system outlined in Sect. 3.1 are imple-
mented to model the fixed volumetric water management system only. This is repre-
sented in the model by constraints on license usage. When the river flows are below
the threshold limit defined by the hands-off-flow (HoF), the license is temporarily sus-15
pended, prohibiting abstractions or trading of this license. The rule specified in Sect. 57
of the 1991 Water Resources Act reduces spray irrigation water diversions when river
flow reaches low levels. In our model a 50% rationing is imposed on farmers when
river flows are below the flow historically exceeded 95% of the time at the downstream
gauges (see Appendix A for equations).20
To model PWS Reservoir operation rules, the following set of instructions is em-
ployed for both the fixed and dynamic water management licensing regimes. If reservoir
storage is below the minimum volume, withdrawals from the reservoir stop. Storage tar-
get seeking behaviour by utilities is modelled by penalizing storage target deviations in
the objective function. As the reservoir levels get progressively lower, the more water-25
saving initiatives are implemented, and the lower proportion of the demand is satisfied,
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resulting in lower benefits from water use for the water company and the consumers.
This loss of benefits is reflected in the reservoir deviation penalty factor α (y axis in
Fig. 2, left panel):
Deviationj = α
∣∣∣∣∣tResj − ∑
k∈Owner
Reskj
∣∣∣∣∣ , (3)
5
where tResj is the seasonal storage target level (Fig. 2, right panel).
Water companies can implement demand reduction measures during droughts and
temporarily restrict non-critical water uses to ensure that key water demands are sat-
isfied. To reflect this in the model, the volume of water abstracted from the reservoir is
reduced when storage levels are low using a hedging constraint (Appendix A).10
When the PWS Reservoir storage volume is low and demand reductions are imple-
mented, the PWS intake license manager is not expected to sell any water. This leads
to the following trading rule: when the reservoir level is 50% below target, water sales
by PWS the following week are prohibited, until the level recovers.
3.3.2 Water trading15
Agricultural users require water for the irrigation season and will in many instances be
unwilling to sell their license before it. To represent varying degrees of water market
participation, a limit on volumes sold by agricultural users was set in both the fixed and
dynamic water management system modelling. For this a constraint (Appendix A) im-
plicitly sets aside a portion of the yearly license for own use and ensures the user does20
not sell prematurely, exposing themselves to requiring water purchases later in the
year. A “trade reluctance coefficient” is used to represent the degree to which farmers
keep licensed water for their own use, and can be customized for each user enabling
the analyst to consider diverse market participation. If the coefficient is set to 0, the
user always prefers to trade whenever it is economically beneficial, regardless of likely25
own future water needs. Conversely, users with coefficient of 1 are conservative and
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will not sell water until they fully satisfy their yearly demand (at the end of the irrigation
season).
3.4 Parameterizing dynamic environmental flows
The model was applied to the River Great Ouse basin using hydrological data from one
of the driest years on record, characterized by low river flows for the first 8 months of5
the year, followed by wet autumn and winter (“naturalized” flow in Fig. 3). Using the En-
vironmental Flow Indicator method discussed in Sect. 2.3, and taking into consideration
the Abstraction Sensitivity Band of the river basin, the allowable water abstractions are
calculated as proportions of naturalised flow (Table 1). In Table 1, percentile naturalised
flow is the percentage of time flow historically exceeded a given flow value provided by10
the England’s Environment Agency (EA, 2013).
4 Model results
Below we review model results focusing on how the two licensing systems diverge in
protecting environmental flows, water allocated to each sector, and plausible trades
under a short-term spot water market.15
4.1 Protection of the environment
Figure 3 compares modelled river flow exiting the river basin under the two licensing
systems. The current system leads to large variability in river flows through the year,
decreasing to low levels incompatible with recent regulations such as the European
Water Framework Directive (Acreman and Ferguson, 2010). This is the result of the20
asymmetric impact of environmental hands-off-flow (HoF) conditions on individual li-
censes. HoFs were assigned to new licenses in the past to prevent over-abstraction of
rivers but were not applied retrospectively to early licenses granted in the 1960s (see
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Sect. 3.1). As a result, some (large) licenses are not affected by HoFs and the system
is not effective at ensuring environmentally acceptable abstractions during the drought.
The drought river flows are improved with the proposed licensing system (Fig. 3)
and its higher environmental allocation. Whereas the current licensing system brings
the flow to nearly zero for over 40% of the dry year, the proposed licensing system5
never falls below 680MLweek−1.
4.2 Water diversions
With the more stringent environmental protection enforced by the proposed scalable
licensing system all users face a lower amount of water available for diversion. The
total annual volume of water diverted decreases by over 40% (from 88000ML to10
50 000ML). All water users except industry decrease their diversions: PWS Reservoir
by 44%, PWS Intake – 8%, power station – 38%, agriculture sector – 26%, private
water supply – 14%. Industrial user increases its abstraction by less than 1%.
The large decrease in the PWS Reservoir abstraction is the main enabler of the
higher river flows under the proposed system (Fig. 3). Under the current system there15
are no Hands-off Flow conditions imposed on the PWS licenses and the reservoir di-
verts heavily during the drought to stay within 50% of its storage targets (Fig. 4, top
panel). Under license scaling the reservoir’s weekly water license is scaled down to
less than a quarter of the reservoir’s historical weekly diversion for most weeks of the
year causing a rapid decrease in reservoir storage volumes that almost empties the20
reservoir (Fig. 4, lower panel).
4.3 License trading results
Figures 5 and 6 show which sectors are buying and selling water under the current and
proposed licensing systems respectively.
Lower diversion allowances under the proposed system lead to a more active water25
market, with the number of trades more than doubling (127% increase) and the volume
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traded increasing by 77% (see Table 2). Trading between users from different sectors
also increases. Figure 7 shows the proportion of total yearly volumes transferred be-
tween sectors. Under the current licensing system the largest transactions by volume
are from public water supply (PWS) to the power station (94%). Under the proposed
shares-based system the power station is the largest buyer until autumn (Fig. 6), pur-5
chasing from both the PWS intake and agricultural businesses, followed by transfers
from the power station to the PWS Reservoir in autumn and winter. Agricultural users
also sell to the PWS Reservoir towards the end of the year, after the growing season.
The purchases by PWS Reservoir are made to re-fill the reservoir which was depleted
through the year under the proposed licensing system.10
In the current volumetric licensing simulation, license-holders generally either sell or
buy water through the year, and rarely switch from one status to the other. In the pro-
posed shares-based system however, some users who buy at the beginning of the year
become sellers at the end of the year, and vice versa. Under the current system some
license holders are affected by the drought more than others because of the stricter15
HoF conditions on their licenses, and are therefore systematically disadvantaged dur-
ing droughts. With the proposed shares system as simulated, all users are affected by
reductions in the available resource, and short-term leasing enables them to manage
their water needs effectively: selling in weeks when they have no or low demand for
water and purchasing from other users when they have relatively high economic water20
demands unmet by their allocation.
Under proposed licensing, when the PWS Reservoir storage volume reaches half of
the target level by mid-April, PWS intake ceases selling water due to the trading con-
straint outlined in Sect. 3.3.2, PWS Intake becomes a buyer in July–August, purchasing
small volumes from private water supply license holders and farmers taking advantage25
of the first opportunity to start filling its reservoir. Under the current licensing system
water trading stops as river flow recovers in mid-September whereas in the shares-
based system, trading continues until the end of the year. The reason for this is the
large impact of license scaling on the PWS Reservoir as discussed in Sect. 4.2. Low
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storage volumes activate demand reduction measures which impose an opportunity
cost on the water company and its customers and the marginal value of stored water
increases (as represented by the penalty function defined in Sect. 3.3.2). The reservoir
is refilled late in the year using its own license and purchases from other users.
5 Discussion5
The model tracks individual transactions allowing the analyst to assess how water mar-
kets could operate under different water licensing regimes and how individual abstrac-
tors could be affected. The aim of the model is to inform the policy makers of the
potential outcomes of water management regulations and assess the effectiveness of
a proposed licensing system in increasing environmental protection whilst reducing10
economic costs of water scarcity.
Gross economic benefits from water use are estimated for each abstraction license
holder using their economic water demand functions (see Erfani et al., 2014, for de-
tails). For each week, the benefits generated from water use by each abstractor were
aggregated into sectoral benefits. Figure 8 compares the economic benefits by sector15
generated from water use for the two licensing systems in conjunction with the mod-
elled water market. The energy sector sees the largest decrease in benefits with the
introduction of the increased environmental protection associated with the proposed li-
censing system. Compared to the current licensing arrangement plus a market, the loss
in benefits through the dry year across all sectors is estimated at £ 94 million (a 15%20
reduction, from £611 million for current licensing to £ 517 million with the proposed sys-
tem, both with the modelled surface water market). Erfani et al. (2014) estimated the
total annual economic benefits for the same system and year with current licensing and
without trading at £ 575 million. In this case, the estimated opportunity cost of improved
environmental flows is £ 58 million, a 10% loss in economic benefits.25
These opportunity costs for improving environmental flows may appear large. Our
analysis uses catchment inflows from one of the driest years on record so this cost
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can be considered an upper-bound on potential costs imposed on water users for en-
hanced environmental performance. Also, if the power station had an alternative supply
to its surface water licence, its opportunity costs would decrease. To put the value in
perspective, a survey by NERA (2007) estimated the present value of improvements
in water environment of all water bodies in the UK to be between £ 18bn and £29bn5
(benefits incurred for an indefinite period), or between £ 618 and £ 1020 million per
year. Garrod and Willis (1996) estimated the annual value of alleviating low flows for
River Darent (river catchment area is 14% of the Great Ouse) at around £ 37 million
(£ 2011).
Our model uses a single-objective (“aggregate”) optimisation formulation that max-10
imises the total social welfare of all water users to simulate the water market. Single-
objective optimisation emulates centralised water allocation but is appropriate to model
regulated water markets “as long as interactions between agents and competition for
resources can be interpreted in a competitive market paradigm” (Britz et al., 2013;
Erfani et al., 2014).15
Several model limitations and simplifications should be mentioned. Groundwater re-
sources were excluded from the model because we focus is on the effects of changing
the surface water licensing system. Abstraction license holders sometimes possess
more than one license, sometimes for both surface water and groundwater abstrac-
tions. In this case, they will likely draw strategically from across their asset base (e.g.20
a water company will cost minimise when choosing sources), and such strategic ab-
straction would increase in a market – this is not considered in our current model
where each abstraction point is modelled independently. Some abstractors, particu-
larly agricultural ones, have small “winter storage” reservoirs to enable inter-temporal
water management. Such users would likely switch between different water sources25
during droughts and involve reservoirs in sophisticated and diverse ways. At the time
of the analysis, we did not have data on locations and capacities of small reservoirs
and so this detail is left to later work. Most strategic behaviours across different assets
2982
HESSD
11, 2967–3003, 2014
Protecting
environmental flows
through enhanced
water licensing
T. Erfani et al.
Title Page
Abstract Introduction
Conclusions References
Tables Figures
J I
J I
Back Close
Full Screen / Esc
Printer-friendly Version
Interactive Discussion
D
iscussion
P
aper
|
D
iscussion
P
aper
|
D
iscussion
P
aper
|
D
iscussion
P
aper
|
and over time (long-term decisions) are not reflected and are beyond the scope of this
paper.
Economic water demands were estimated using past literature and are indicative of
the water values across the different uses in our catchment. In our model water diver-
sions and trading are driven primarily by the spatially and temporally varying values of5
water as encoded in weekly demand curves for each abstractor. In reality, economic
considerations are not the only drivers for human behaviour. Actual water markets
would depend on the pre-existing social networks within the basin, preferences and
attitudes towards trading, as well as perceptions of fairness and justice (Syme et al.,
1999). Such motivations were not represented in our hydro-economic model because10
they are not known. We take steps to represent some attitudes to trading by introducing
a trade reluctance coefficient for agricultural users and embedding water company op-
erating rules regarding their assets by a rule on trading. Furthermore, in our model the
propensity of different agents to trade with each other can be calibrated on a pair-wise
basis using transaction costs. In our application we set transaction costs by abstractor15
sector but a more detailed study of transaction costs could be performed.
6 Conclusions
This paper uses a hydro-economic model to assess the performance of two water
licensing regimes in conjunction with surface water markets. The first regime is the
minimum-flow-based system with fixed volumetric licenses currently used in England20
and Wales. The second one is proposed licensing system based on scalable licenses
where shares are translated into actual permissible allocation volumes depending on
minimum environmental flows that are set dynamically to adapt to naturalised flow
conditions. The model was applied to the Great Ouse river basin in East England over
a historically dry year.25
Results suggest the proposed dynamic environmental flow with scalable licens-
ing system is better able to prevent very low flows during droughts than the current
2983
HESSD
11, 2967–3003, 2014
Protecting
environmental flows
through enhanced
water licensing
T. Erfani et al.
Title Page
Abstract Introduction
Conclusions References
Tables Figures
J I
J I
Back Close
Full Screen / Esc
Printer-friendly Version
Interactive Discussion
D
iscussion
P
aper
|
D
iscussion
P
aper
|
D
iscussion
P
aper
|
D
iscussion
P
aper
|
abstraction regime based on volumetric licensing. Flows under the proposed system
don’t reduce below 680MLweek−1 whereas under current licensing flows reduce down
to nearly zero for over 4 months of the year. With more water left to the environment,
less water is available to satisfy human water demands leading to a more active water
market. The number of trades under the scalable licenses system is more than double5
the number under current system and the volume traded is 77% greater. Still the more
active water market is not able to compensate for the loss of abstraction (increases in
environmental flows); the opportunity cost of the increased environmental quality in the
dry year is a loss of about 15% compared to the current licensing system with a wa-
ter market, or 10% when compared to current system without a market (the current10
situation).
As pressure on water resources increases, water licensing systems will be expected
to balance human and environmental water uses in increasingly effective and sophisti-
cated ways. The English water allocation regime is currently being re-designed to pro-
tect environmental flows whilst minimising the societal economic cost of water scarcity.15
Water markets are viewed as part of the solution as they allow short-term econom-
ically efficient re-allocation of water during scarcity events. In designing new water
allocation institutions regulators will want to assess how new water allocation sys-
tems could work in conjunction with water trading to manage droughts. Customized
hydro-economic models, such as the one applied in this paper, help simulate coupled20
human-environmental systems, predict plausible behaviours and impacts, and assess
proposed policies.
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Appendix A
Formulation details
In this appendix we reproduce the formulation from Erfani et al. (2014) for reader conve-
nience. Section headers specify which section of the current paper the equation relates
to.5
Pair-wise trading model
The pair-wise trading model follows the multi-commodity modelling framework with an
extra index k on the flow variable to represent water ownership (Erfani et al., 2013).
The objective function of the model is
NetBenefit =
∑
iUser
totalBenefiti −
∑
iUser
totalCosti −
∑
j∈ReservoirDeviationj (A1)10
subject to the following mass balance constraints:∑
j
COj i=1
xkji + inFli +
∑
l∈UserReturnFlowl i =
∑
j
COi j=1
xkij
∀i ∈ Junction,k ∈Owner,DWl i = 1 (A2)
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∑
i
COi j=1
xkij +pRes
k
j = Res
k
j +
∑
i
COj i=1
xkji ∀j ∈ Reservoir,k ∈Owner (A3)
∑
j
COj i=1
xkji =
∑
j
COi j=1
xkij +WaterAbstracted
k
i +Trade
k∈river
i
∀i ∈ User,k ∈Owner (A4)
Tradek∈riveri =
∑
j
COi j=1
xii j ∀i ∈ User (A5)
ReturnFlowi j =
∑
kOwner
(1−consFactori )WaterAbstractedki5
∀i ∈ User,DWi j = 1 (A6)∑
k∈river
∑
i
COi j=1
xkij = Dischargej ∀j ∈ Discharge (A7)
Current license restrictions
At the beginning of each week, the river flow is checked and if the value is below the10
HoF limit, the license is suspended for the upcoming week (Erfani et al., 2014). This is
imposed using the following constraint:(
flGAj ≤ AlGAj
) −→ (WaterAbstractedk∈riveri +Tradek∈riveri = 0)
∀i ∈ user, j ∈Gauge,RuGAi j = 1 (A8)15
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In addition, the 50% rationing is imposed on farmers using the following set of check
constraints:(
flGAj ≤Q95GAj
) −→ (WaterAbstractedk∈riveri +Tradek∈riveri ≤ 0.5×WkLii)
∀i ∈ Agriculture, j ∈Gauge,UpGAi j = 1. (A9)5
For the PWS reservoir, the volumetric capacity constraint is as follows:
2627 ≤
∑
k∈Owner
Reskj ≤ 55450 ∀j ∈ Reservoir. (A10)
The hedging constraint for water company demand reduction is represented by:
WaterAbstractedji = F
( ∑
k∈Owner
Reskj
)
,10
∀i ∈ user, j ∈ Reservoir,COl i = 1 (A11)
where F (.) is the function shown in Fig. A1 which represents the relationship between
the reservoir level, as a percentage of the target, and the proportion of demand that is
satisfied.15
Water trading
At each weekly time period t of the modelling agricultural willingness to sell their license
is represented using:
Tradek∈riveri ≤max{0,sLti } ∀i ∈ user. (A12)20
This limit (sL) applies until the farmer abstracts a proportion ci of their expected water
needs (EWNi ) which is based on their historical yearly water use. For each user i ,
sLti =
{
sLt−1i −WaterUse
t
i , Sum of abstraction up to time t ≤ ci ×EWNi
WkLii , otherwise
(A13)
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where WaterUse is the sum of water diverted and sold, ci is a value ranging from 0 to
1, and
sL0i = YrLii −ci ×EWNi . (A14)
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Table 1. Allowable river diversions under the EFI system, defined as a percentage of river flow
(source: EA, 2013).
Percentile natural flow at downstream Q30 Q50 Q70 Q95
gauge of the sub-catchment
Percentage of naturalised flow allowed 26 24 20 15
for abstraction (%)
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Table 2. Numbers of trades, buyers and sellers, and volumetric annual totals under the 2 li-
censing regimes for a simulated historical dry year.
Volumetric licenses Sharing system
Number of trades 299 678
Sellers 48 90
Buyers 19 32
Total volumes traded,ML 2750 4860
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Table A1. Nomenclature.
Junction No-demand and non-storage nodes which join 2 or more links in the network
User The set of all licensed river abstractors including agriculture, industry, water supply and
energy
Owner The set of all water right holders, reservoirs and the river
xkij Decision variable, the water flowing from node i to j with license holder k
inFli External hydrological inflow at junction node i
COi j Connectivity matrix which contains 1 if node i is connected to node j , 0 if no connection
pReskj Reservoir j storage carried over from previous time step with water license k
Reskj Reservoir j storage with water license k
tResj Reservoir j target
WaterAbstractedki Water consumed by user i which is either bought from owner k or abstracted from river
using user i ’s license
Tradek∈riveri Water license leased for one time-step by user i
ReturnFlowi j Water returned back to the river at downstream junction node j of user i based on the
consumption factor of user i
DWi j Junction node j downstream of user i
consFactori Fraction of water evaporated relative to diverted for user i
Dischargej Discharge sink j at the mouth of the river
WkLii Weekly license allowance for user i to abstract water from river
YrLii Yearly license allowance for user i to abstract water from river
Deviationj Deviation of reservoir j from its target storage volume
flGAj Flow at gauge j
AlGAj Allowable flow at gauge j
RuGAi j Information with regards to the hands of flow condition which equals one if user i ab-
straction is controlled with the level of flow at gauge j
Q95GAj Q95 flow level at gauge j
UpGAi j Agriculture user i upstream of gauge j
WaterUseti Water used by user i at time t including the abstraction and trading
sLti Selling limit for user i at time t
EWNi Historical expectation of water needs for user i
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 25 
 1 
Figure 1 Map of the Great Ouse River basin showing approximate locations of water users 2 
and main river flow gauging stations: A – last flow gauge in the basin (sink), B – Offord 3 
gauge defining license scaling for PWS Reservoir and Power station, C – gauge defining 4 
license scaling for agricultural users located in the River Ivel tributary. 5 
Fig. 1. Map of the Great Ouse river basin showing approximate locations of water users and
main river flow gauging stations: A – last flow gauge in the basin (sink), B – Offord gauge defin-
ing license scaling for PWS Reservoir and Power station, C – gauge defining license scaling
for agricultural users located in the River Ivel tributary.
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 1 
Figure 2 Reservoir storage deviation penalty (left), PWS Reservoir storage targets (right) 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
Figure 3 River flow at the last gauge in the basin (marked A in Figure 1). 10 
Fig. 2. Reservoir storage deviation penalty (left panel), PWS Reservoir storage targets (right
panel).
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Figure 2 Reservoir storage deviation penalty (left), PWS Reservoir storage targets (right) 2 
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Figure 3 River flow at the last gauge in the basin (marked A in Figure 1). 10 Fig. 3. River flow at the last gauge in the basin (marked A in Fig. 1).
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 1 
 2 
Figure 4 PWS Reservoir storage and abstraction profiles for current (top) and proposed 3 
(bottom) licensing systems. 4 
 5 
Fig. 4. PWS Reservoir storage and abstraction profiles for current (top panel) and proposed
(bottom panel) licensing systems.
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 1 
Figure 5 Water volumes bought (top) and sold (bottom) in millions of litres per week by 2 
sector under the current licensing (volumetric) system. 3 
 4 
Fig. 5. Water volumes bought (top panel) and sold (bottom panel) in millions of litres per week
by sector under the current licensing (volumetric) system.
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 1 
Figure 6 Water volumes bought (top) and sold (bottom) in millions of litres per week by 2 
sector under the proposed (scalable) licensing system. 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
Figure 7 Proportion of the total annual volume of trade transactions between sectors under 8 
the current (left) and proposed (right) licensing systems as simulated in a dry year.  9 
 10 
Fig. 6. Water volumes bought (top panel) and sold (bottom panel) in millions of litres per week
by sector under the proposed (scalable) licensing system.
3000
HESSD
11, 2967–3003, 2014
Protecting
environmental flows
through enhanced
water licensing
T. Erfani et al.
Title Page
Abstract Introduction
Conclusions References
Tables Figures
J I
J I
Back Close
Full Screen / Esc
Printer-friendly Version
Interactive Discussion
D
iscussion
P
aper
|
D
iscussion
P
aper
|
D
iscussion
P
aper
|
D
iscussion
P
aper
|
 29 
 1 
Figure 6 Water volumes bought (top) and sold (bottom) in millions of litres per week by 2 
sector under the proposed (scalable) licensing system. 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
Figure 7 Proportion of the total annual volume of trade transactions between sectors under 8 
the current (left) and proposed (right) licensing systems as simulated in a dry year.  9 
 10 
Fig. 7. Proportion of the total annual volume of trade transactions between sectors under the
current (left panel) and proposed (right panel) licensing systems as simulated in a dry year.
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 1 
 2 
Figure 8 Comparison of gross economic benefits by sector from water use under the current 3 
and proposed licensing systems acting in conjunction with a short-term water market. The 4 
results are aggregated by sector: a) Agriculture; b) Industry; c) Water Supply; d) Energy. The 5 
top panels show benefits in thousands of pounds and the bottom one in millions. 6 
 7 
 8 
Fig. 8. Comparison of gross economic benefits by sector from water use under the current and
proposed licensing systems acting in conjunction with a short-term water market. The results
are aggregated by sector: (a) agriculture; (b) industry; (c) water s l ; (d) nergy. The top
panels show benefits in thousands of pounds and the bottom one in millions.
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Figure B.1 Public Water Supply company hedging rule. 1 
Fig. A1. Public Water Supply company hedging rule.
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